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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE CAPITAL NATURE OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
Taxpayer, a practicing psychiatrist and part-time teacher of psy-
chiatry, undertook a six year training program in psychoanalysis at the
Boston Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1961, he deducted $3,650 paid
in fees to the Institute as a business expense under section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Although taxpayer contended that the ex-
penses were incurred primarily to maintain or improve skills required
in his profession, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction. A sharp-
ly divided Tax Court upheld the disallowance, relying on two prior
cases holding that when a psychiatrist undertakes training in psycho-
analysis, he manifests an intent to acquire a specialty, not to maintain
or improve existing skills. The Tax Court majority emphasized two
points in taxpayer's testimony it found fatal to the claimed deduction:
he failed to testify that he did not intend to practice psychoanalysis
upon graduation from the Institute; and he failed to say that his
primary purpose for taking the training was to improve his psychiatric
skills.1 On appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, a unanimous
court reversed. Held: Acquiring a specialty is not necessarily incon-
sistent with improving or maintaining existing skills; taxpayer's un-
rebutted testimony established that his purpose in studying psychoan-
alysis was to improve his psychiatric skills; thus, the expense is
deductible. Greenberg v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir.
1966) .2
For tax purposes under the statutory framework, an individual in-
curs expenses in either personal or income producing activities. Under
section 262 of the Internal Revenue Code, personal, living and family
expenses are not deductible in computing taxable income.3 Expenses
incurred in the production of income may be deductible from gross in-
come either as business expenses under section 1621 or as non-business
expenses under section 212.1 Since the regulations expressly exclude
instruments resulting in lack of predictability and increased litigation. 361 F.2d
at 563-64. See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
1 Ramon M. Greenberg, 45 T.C. 480, 482 (1966).
The commissioner did not authorize certiorari following the First Circuit decision.
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family
expenses."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 162 provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business. ... "
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
1) for the production or collection of income....
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educational expenses from the deductions allowed under section 212,1
they must qualify as section 162 business expenses to be deductible.
There are two types of business expenses, capital and ordinary.
Capital expenditures, in general, are not deductible from gross income,7
but under section 162, all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
while carrying on a trade or business are deductible. Educational
expenses are unique, however, because they usually have the attributes
of all three types of expense-personal, capital and "ordinary and
necessary." The problem is determining whether a particular educa-
tional expense constitutes a section 162 business expense.
Recognizing the difficulty in isolating the dominant feature of educa-
tional expenses, the Commissioner promulgated regulations in 1958
which attempted to establish standards for determining deductibility.
The regulations provide that educational expenses are ordinary and
necessary business expenses when incurred for the primary purpose of
maintaining or improving the taxpayer's existing skills.' In applying
the regulations, the courts have considered three major factors: the
custom within a taxpayer's profession of acquiring a given skill;I the
relationship between the acquired and existing skills; 10 and the tax-
payer's subjective intent in acquiring the skill."
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1954) provides:
Among expenditures not allowable as deductions under section 212 are the
following: ... expenses of taking special courses or training; ... expenses such
as those paid or incurred in seeking employment or in placing oneself in a
position to begin rendering personal services for compensation ....
TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263(a) (1) provides: "No deduction shall be allowed
for-
Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate...."
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a) (1958) provides:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are deductible if they are
for education (including research activities) undertaken primarily for the pur-
pose of:
1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his employ-
ment or other trade or business, or....
'See Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Cosimo A.
Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962); John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5 (a) (1958) provides: "If it is customary for other established members of the
taxpayer's trade or business to undertake such education, the taxpayer will ordinarily
be considered to have undertaken the education for the purposes described...."
"See Campbell v. United States, =spra note 9; Welsh v. United States, 210 F.
Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd per curiarn, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Rev. Rul.
60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 69, 70, provides:
[I]t is necessary that the taxpayer show his purpose through specific facts. In
this connection it will be necessary for him to establish that the education does
maintain or improve skills required in his employment or other business. The
skills "required" by the taxpayer or other trade or business are those which
are appropriate, helpful, or needed.
'See Welsh v. United States, supra note 10. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1958)
provides:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are not deductible if they
[ VOL. 42: 903
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The major issue in the principal case, according to the court, was
whether taxpayer's primary purpose in taking the psychoanalytic train-
ing was to maintain or improve his practice of psychiatry, not whether
taxpayer acquired a specialty. 12 Countering the Commissioner's argu-
ment that acquiring a specialty is inconsistent with "maintaining or
improving" an existing skill, the court pointed to a line of cases" in
which taxpayers had been allowed to deduct the expenses of acquiring
specialties. The court rejected as inflexible the view that the expense
of acquiring a specialty is always nondeductible. 4 In determining
taxpayer's primary purpose, the court relied on "clear" testimony that
taxpayer undertook the analytic training to improve his psychiatric
skills.'5 The court concluded that the Tax Court either had misapplied
the regulations by assuming that the expenses of acquiring a specialty
were not deductible, or had rejected unjustifiably taxpayer's unrebut-
ted testimony about his primary purpose in taking the training. "
Until 1950, the courts disallowed all educational expense deductions
on the ground that the personal and capital aspects outweighed the
ordinary business nature of the expenses.' 7 In 1950, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in Hill v. Commissioner," allowed a school
teacher to deduct summer school expenses required to maintain her
are for education undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new
position or substantial advancement in position, or primarily for the purpose of
fulfilling the general aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer.
The fact that the education undertaken meets express requirements for the new
position or substantial advancement in position will be an important factor
indicating that the education is undertaken primarily for the purpose of
obtaining such position or advancement.... (Emphasis added.)
1367 F.2d at 666.
'3 367 F.2d at 666 n.4.
"This view had been expressed in the two cases relied on by the Commissioner
and the Tax Court: Grant Gilmore, 38 T.C. 765 (1962) and Arnold Nanrow, 33 T.C.
419 (1959), aff'd, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961). The
court in the principal case distinguished these cases on the basis that they may have
been cases where there was "insufficient evidence of the reasons why a psychiatrist
would consider psychonalytic knowledge as helpful in this psychiatric practice."
367 F.2d at 667. Despite this distinction, the court rejected the implicit reasoning
in these decisions, stating: "the holdings have hardened into what we consider the
unrealistic doctrine that, since psychoanalysis is a speciality... it cannot be con-
sidered as an improvement in skills for a psychiatrist... ." 367 F.2d at 667.
" In elaborating on the "clear" testimony which showed taxpayer undertook the
training to improve his psychiatric skills, the court inferred that taxpayer intended
to use psychoanalysis solely as a form of psychotherapy for treating his patients.
The court found that psychoanalysis and psychiatry were not unrelated, that it was
not unusual for a psychiatrist to train in psychoanalysis, and that there was no
evidence that taxpayer intended to secure a substantial advancement in position or
to abandon his position at the hospital. 367 F.2d at 666, 668.
Ibid.
17 See generally The Deductibility of Educational Expenses Under Section
162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 4 Wmx. & MARY L. REv. 55 (1963).
181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
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teaching credentials. In a second landmark case decided in 1954,
Coughlin v. Commissioner,19 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed a lawyer to deduct expenses of a summer tax institute because
his partners expected him to keep informed on tax matters. Then in
1958, the Commissioner promulgated regulations under section 162
which made educational expenses deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses.2 0
To qualify for deduction under section 162, an educational expense
must meet four tests. First, an educational expense must not be a
personal expense. 2' The learning experience is inherently personal,
combining both an individual's aspirations to enrich his cultural back-
ground22 and his time and effort in making the experience productive.
However, an individual's education is also intimately related to his
capacity to produce income. Whether the dominant feature of an ed-
ucational expense is personal is a question of degree, not of kind. 3
For tax purposes, such expenses should be deemed non-personal when
incurred to aid in the production of taxpayer's income. Thus, educa-
tion undertaken to obtain a substantial advancement in position or to
obtain a new position should be deemed non-personal.24
Second, an educational expense must be incurred while carrying on a
trade or business, not while furthering a non-business, income-produc-
ing activity.3 Neither the statute nor the regulations define "trade or
business" and its use in different sections of the Code has yielded
varying definitions depending on the section in question.2 A common
203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).See note 7 supra.
'A purely personal educational expense would be one incurred solely to satisfy
an individual's desire to acquire a leisure skill, such as skiing, painting, music or eve-
ning courses in art, literature or any other topic.2 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).2 Id. at 114.
4 Because such an expense would be deemed non-personal would not mean it would
be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162. It might
still be non-deductible as a capital expense. This distinction is not made clear by
the Commissioner's regulations which seem to consider education undertaken to
obtain a new position as a non-deductible personal expense. See note 11 supra. See
also Note, 4 HousToN L. REv. 524, 526, & n.16 (1966).
' The Commissioner's regulations expressly exclude the deduction of educational
expenses incurred to promote non-business income producing activity. See note 6
supra. Ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162 include educational
expenses, so there is no reason why § 212 should exclude educational expenses when
they are ordinary and necessary non-business expenses. In both instances, the
deductibility of the educational expense is allowed to increase the accuracy of matching
income and expenses, business, or non-business.
' See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 62, 162, 165, 166, 172, 1221, & 1231. These sections
deal with adjusted gross income, trade or business expenses, losses, bad debts, net
operating loss deduction, the definition of capital assets and involuntary conversions.
For definitions of "trade or business" under these sections, see 4A MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL IxcoAm TAXATION § 25.08 (1966); Allen & Orechokff, Toward a More
[ VOL. 42: 903
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and useful general definition for section 162 purposes is that a trade or
business is a "going concern '2 7 operated for profit28 with the taxpayer
holding himself out as selling goods or services. A profession such as
law or medicine qualifies as a trade or business.29
Third, the educational expense must not be a capital expenditure. 0
This term is not comprehensively defined in the statute or regulations.3'
However, judicially pronounced distinctions between "capital" and
"ordinary and necessary" expenses indicate that capital expenses are
those incurred to permanently improve property or to acquire some-
thing that contributes to the production of future income,32 not repair
S ,stematic Drafting and Interpreting of the Internal Revenue Code: Expenses,
Losses and Bad Debts, 25 U. CHL L. REV. 1 (1957); Groh, "Trade or Business":
What it Means, What it is and What it is not, 26 J. T..AXATi N 78 (1967).
' Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965).
Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1964).
See 4A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDEDRAL INcomE TAXATION § 25.08 at 33 (1966).
"For a blanket repudiation of the capital nature of educational expenses, see
Deductibility of Educational Expenses, 6 STAN. L. REv. 547, 550 (1954).
"1 The definition of a capital asset is found in the Code for purposes of deter-
mining capital gains or losses. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221, provides:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include-
1) stock in trade... which would properly be included in the inventory of the
taxpayer ....
2) property, used in his trade or business,. .. subject to the allowance for
depreciation ....
Although every capital expenditure does not purchase a capital asset, for general
purposes of § 162 expenses, § 1221 is helpful in indicating what capital expenses are
not.
Likewise a capital expense is not a repair expense. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958)
provides:
The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value of the
property nor appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient
operating condition, may be deducted as an expense ....
For accounting purposes under the Code, a general rule for determining capital
expenses is found in the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1 (a) (1954) provides:
If an expenditure results in the creation of an asset having a useful life which
extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, such an expenditure
may not be deductible, or may be deductible only in part, for the taxable year
in which made.
See also note 6 supra.
' The cases fall roughly into two groups and provide guidelines for distinguish-
ing "capital" and "ordinary" expenses. First, there are the cases which deal with
improvements or repairs to property. The expense of a repair reflects the current
costs of upkeep and is considered ordinary and not capital. The expense of an im-
provement which reflects long term increased future production costs is capital and
not ordinary. Second, there are the cases dealing with pre-paid rentals or pre-paid
insurance premiums. Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st
Cir. 1942); See also Cohn v. United States, 52 AFTR 1298 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd,
259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (flying school allowed to amortize expenses of training
flying instructors over the life of the school). A pre-paid rental is a present expense
for both the current period rent and the rents for future periods. The current period
rent expense is deductible as an ordinary expense, while the rent amounts which will
cover future periods are considered capital expenses which must be amortized over
the future periods.
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expenses or costs of securing present income. Thus, for purposes of
section 162, a capital expense is one which results in something which
contributes to income production for a substantial period (at least
beyond one year). Justice Cardozo noted that learning is capital in
nature, that it is, like the good will of an old partnership, akin to a
capital asset.33 Later decisions have criticized this dictum, finding that
learning is too evanescent to embrace the permanency required by the
capital asset concept.34 However, if an educational expense substan-
tially enlarges or secures taxpayer's future income producing capacity,
it can appropriately be termed a capital expense.
Fourth, an educational expense must be an ordinary and necessary
business expense. An expense is ordinary if it is "normal, usual or
customary."3 To be necessary, it need not be indispensable or re-
quired; 36 rather it must be "appropriate or helpful. '37 In determining
whether the undertaking of a given educational program is "normal,
usual or customary," the courts have used both common sense notions
of custom" and statistical studies.3 9 The failure to show a customary
practice will not prevent the deduction, however, for some courts have
allowed educational expense deductions to aid the pioneer in his field.4
In determining whether an expense is "appropriate or helpful," the
courts have required only that the acquired and existing skill be
reasonably related.4
Attempting to clarify the "ordinary and necessary" test for educa-
tion expenses, the Commissioner's regulations provide that education
expenses undertaken primarily for the purpose of maintaining or im-
proving a taxpayer's existing skills are deductible. 2 Analyzed in light
of the four points above, the requirement that the education be taken
to improve taxpayer's existing skills corresponds to the statutory
requirement that the expense be dominantly business and not personal
in nature. Once the expense is shown to be a business expense, the
requirement that the education maintain and improve taxpayer's exist-
ing skills corresponds to the statutory requirement that the expense
'Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1953).
Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1939). See also note 9 supra.
4A MERTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INComE TAXATION § 25.09 n.72.8 (1966).
'Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). See note 10 supra.
John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1959).
Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 701 (1962).
'
0 Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
"Id. at 945; Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd,
329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964) ; see note 10 supra.
"See note 8 supra.
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be ordinary and necessary and not capital in nature. The courts,
however, have applied the regulation language without attention to the
statutory requirements: first, that the expense be business and not
personal in nature; and second, that the expense be ordinary and not
capital in nature. Predictibility in tax planning has decreased and con-
fusion and litigation have increased.' "
In Arnold Namrow 4 a practicing psychiatrist incurred education
expenses for a seven year training course in psychoanalysis at the
Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. The Tax Court, after extensive
inquiry into the relationship between psychiatry and psychoanalysis,45
concluded that "it is manifest petitioners were pursuing the specialized
course in psychoanalysis in order to fit themselves to engage in the
practice of the specialty." 4 The deduction was disallowed.
The deduction would also be disallowed under the four point analysis
outlined above. First, as the expense was admittedly directed at se-
curing an increase in income through referrals,47 it was not a personal
expense. Second, the expense was incurred while taxpayer was en-
gaged in the practice of psychiatry. Third, the expense probably
contributed to the taxpayer's income producing capacity for the re-
mainder of his professional life, and thus constituted a non-deductible
capital expense.
The Commissioner's main argument against deductibility of the ex-
pense in Arnold Namrow was that it was capital in nature.48 The
majority opinion, instead of expressly finding it a capital expense,
'As indicated by the Dawson dissent in the Tax Court opinion in the principal
case, the follo-wing cases represent "a hodgepodge of seemingly irreconciliable
opinions." 45 T.C. at 486. Compare Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (forensic pathologist allowed to deduct law school expenses), with
Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962) (a research psychologist allowed to deduct
expenses for courses for Ph.D. in industrial psychology) and John S. Watson, 31
T.C. 1014 (1959) (an internist allowed to deduct expenses for psychiatry course)
and Markham v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (psychologist
not allowed to deduct psychoanalysis training expenses). See generally Note, The
Deductibility of Education Expenses Under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
4 W V. & MAR'Y L. REv. 55 (1963). Grant Gilmore, 38 T.C. 765 (1962) (psychiatrist
not allowed to deduct psychoanalysis training expenses) and Arnold Namrow, 33
T.C. 419, aff'd, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961) (psy-
chiatrist not allowed to deduct psychoanalysis training expenses).
"Arnold Namrow, note 43 supra.
'5According to the court, psychiatry is a branch of medicine that deals with the
science and practice of treating mental, emotional or behavioral disorders. Psycho-
therapy is the method of treatment used by psychiatrists and includes verbal commu-
nication through psychoanalysis, nondirective psychotherapy, reeducation, hypnosis or
prestige suggestion. Psychoanalysis is thus a form of psychotherapy, founded by
Sigmund Freud, and involves an intensive investigation of the patient's conscious and
unconscious mind.
1133 T.C. at 434.
,7 33 T.C. at 432,
,133 T.C. at 435.
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disallowed the deduction because the expense was incurred to acquire
a specialty. The court probably assumed that acquiring a specialty
through education is similar to acquiring an income-producing capital
asset. The court premised its decision on the conclusion that psycho-
analysis is a specialty because it is "in effect so regarded by a large
body of medical opinion without whose approval it cannot be success-
fully practiced."49 The majority then concluded that given this spe-
cialty expenditure, it clearly followed that taxpayer intended to do
more than maintain and improve his psychiatry practice. Thus, tax-
payer failed to meet the regulation's primary purpose requirement.",
On essentially the same facts, the court in the principal case re-
jected the Arnold Namrow analysis. 5 The First Circuit found that
even though psychoanalysis may in fact be a specialty, it does not
follow that the taxpayer intended to acquire a new position or profes-
sion; he may have acquired the specialty to improve his existing prac-
tice of psychiatry. Therefore, the essential problem was to determine
taxpayer's primary purpose for taking the training. The court con-
cluded that taxpayer had not intended to obtain a substantial advance-
ment in position or to abandon his position at the hospital; therefore
his expenses were deductible.
The "primary purpose" test of the regulations, as applied by the
court in the principal case does not correspond to the four point
analysis outlined above. The principal case focuses primarily on
whether an educational expense is personal or business in nature. 2
The inquiry is complicated because under the regulations, personal
expenses include what often would be conceptually classified as capital
expenses, e.g., expenses incurred to obtain a substantial advancement in
position. 3 Under this approach, once the court determines that an
49288 F.2d at 652-53. Note, however, that psychoanalysis is not considered a
specialty by the American Medical Association.
' 33 T.C. at 434; See note 9 supra.
367 F. 2d at 666.
12 Before the promulgation of the Commissioner's 1958 regulations, the personal
nature of a self employed taxpayer's educational expenses was found to so outweigh
any business nature of the expense that such expenses were considered nondeductible.
When a corporate employer provides on the job training to employees, there is no
question that the expenses incurred are business in nature and not expended to satisfy
the employee's personal aspirations for learning. With the self-employed taxpayer,
however, the employee and the employer are the same individual, and consequently
it is difficult to distinguish when he incurs educational expenses for personal or
business purposes. The regulations were designed to isolate the primary purpose of
the taxpayer so that the difficulty could be overcome and self-employed taxpayers
could have the same benefits as their employed contemporaries. See Cosimo A.
Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 699; S. REP. No. 1939, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 110; 1958-3 Cum.
BULL. 922, 1031; Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bus.L. 69.
' See note 11 supra. It is arguable that the regulations do not confuse the personal
[ VOL. 42: 903
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expense is not personal, but business in nature, the ordinary and nec-
essary nature of the expense is shown if the acquired and existing skills
are reasonably related. 4 The question whether an expense has a use-
ful income-producing life beyond the current period is not asked.
By contrast, the four point analysis considers all expenses of in-
creasing income-producing capacity as business in nature. Given the
business nature of the expense, it is usually a capital expense when it
is incurred either to obtain a substantial advancement in position or to
increase income-producing capacity beyond the current period. If the
expense is found nondeductible, it is nondeductible because it is a
capital expense. It is not a personal expense as the principal case
analysis would indicate. In short, the four point analysis keeps the
classifications conceptually clear, while the dpproach in the principal
case both confuses the nondeductible categories of personal and capital
expenses and fails to inquire into the capital nature of an expense when
income-producing capacity is increased beyond the current period.
The net result of the incomplete and confused analysis in the ap-
proach adopted in the principal case is a distortion of the basic prin-
ciples behind the "ordinary and necessary" business expense. Under
the net income tax, current expenses are matched against current re-
ceipts to reflect the taxpayer's current income. The approach in the
principal case, which allowed the current deduction of educational
expenses incurred to acquire a specialty, effectively eliminates the
category of capital educational expenses and broadens the categories
of "personal" and "ordinary and necessary" educational expenses. The
determination of current income is distorted. Under a net income tax,
the capital education expense more accurately matches income when
amortized over the professional life of the taxpayer55 than when totally
deducted as a present expense or not deducted as a personal expense.
and capital categories. A careful reading of the regulations suggests that expenses
incurred to obtain a substantial advancement in position are not nondeductible
personal expenses; they are just nondeductible. Nevertheless, the courts have con-
fused the two categories and have held as nondeductible personal expenses, costs
incurred to obtain a substantial advancement in position. Judge Withey, concurring
in the Tax Court opinion in the principal case, cites Nainrow and Gihore as
standing for the view that "the expense of acquiring the new skill is personal in
nature and nondeductible." 45 T.C. at 483. The commentators indicate that the reason
for the confusion is that "drawing a distinction between personal and capital
expenses is immaterial because neither generates a deduction." Heckerling, The
Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Present, and Proposed, 27 OHIo ST.
L.J. 117, 121 (1966) ; See note 24 supra.
See note 41 supra.
SAlthough capital expenditures are generally nondeductible under § 263 of the
Code and the case law, they can often be amortized over a reasonably ascertainable
useful life. There is no reason why a capital educational expense could not be
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The approach in the principal case, not only inhibits accurate calcu-
lation of current income, but the distorted categories of capital, per-
sonal, and ordinary expenses create evidentiary problems. In order to
foster education, the principal case and other recent decisions" have
forced education expenses entirely into the deductible "ordinary and
necessary" category. This has been accomplished by sharply curtailing
the Commissioner's ability to prove taxpayer undertook the training
for other than the alleged business purpose. The court has reduced the
inquiry into taxpayer's primary purpose to a narrow inquiry into tax-
payer's intent at the time he began his training. This narrow inquiry
is difficult because considerable time usually has lapsed between com-
mencement of study and trial and because the courts have not always
accepted later acts as evidence of intent." The search becomes a
quest for taxpayer's subjective purpose in taking the training.58 Given
a well-rehearsed witness, nondeductible personal educational expenses
can be eliminated. All educational expenses incurred by a practicing
professional become ordinary and necessary.
amortized over the professional life of a taxpayer, using tables similar to mortality
tables. Especially in instances like the principle case, in which a total investment
in training can approximate more than $20,000.00 it would seem to be an easily
calculated and convenient way to match income and expenses.
For a court discussion of amortization of a doctor's staff fees over his professional
life, see Wells-Lee v. Commissioner, 360 F. 2d 665 (8th Cir. 1966).
w Ramon M. Greenberg, 367 F.2d 663, 666 n.4 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Campbell v. United
States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd, 329 F. 2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
' The extreme example of this narrowed inquiry is found in lVelsh, supra note 56.
Taxpayer alleged that the legal education he acquired was taken primarily to improve
his skills as an Internal Revenue agent. To refute this allegation, the Commissioner
showed that taxpayer had signed a certificate upon entrance to law school which
stated he intended to practice law upon graduation, and that he subsequently did
practice law. In spite of this cogent evidence, the court allowed the deduction,
holding that taxpayer's primary purpose at the time he began his training was con-
trolling, his later change of mind being of no significance. See generally Heckerling,
The Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Present, and Proposed, 27 OHIo ST.
L.J. 117, 135-39 (1966); Note, Law School Education Expenses After Welsh v.
United States, 11 LOYOLA L. REv. 307 (1962). Note, Deductibility of the Expenses
of Obtaining a Law Degree, 17 U. MrAmi L. REv. 424 (1963).
'As indicated by the Tax Court, Greenberg was a case "bogged down in the mire
of the no man's land of subjective intent." Zeev Melamid, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mlem.
818, 819 n.1 (1966).
Judge Withey, concurring in the Tax Court opinion in the principal case, 45 T.C.
at 483, aptly expressed dissatisfaction with the subjective standard of primary purpose,
as a standard for tax deductibility:
To me, it is unrealistic, not to say naive, to consider that in enacting section
162(a) of the 1954 Code Congress would leave the deductibility or nondeducti-
bility of such an expense to the mere whim of the taxpayer.... If the wording
[of the regulation] is to be read to allow deduction of the expenses of acquiring
a new skill based only upon the intention or whim of the taxpayer with respect
to the ultimate practice of that skill, that section of the regulation... should be
held invalid.
r' As a response to the principal case approach to educational expense deductions, the
Commissioner has proposed new regulations which attempt to return both the personal
[ VOL. 42 : 903
